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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-5173

DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
TDI INC, (f/k/a Traders and Dealers, Incorporated,
f/k/a TDI, Incorporated, f/k/a The Trading Desk, Inc. and
f/k/a U.S. Central Securities, Inc.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES INC.; SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
PENINSULA BANK; THEODORE BENGHIAT; CASTO
EDWIN RIVERA; JERRY MANNING; JOHN STRINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JOSEPH MARZOUCA
v.
SANFORD GOLDFINE; S.D. GOLDFINE & CO.;
(Third-Party Defendants)
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07032)
DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.

S.D. GOLDFINE & COMPANY; SANFORD GOLDFINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JERRY MANNING; JOSEPH
MARZOUCA; THEODORE BENGHIAT;
PENINSULA BANK; CASTO EDWIN RIVERA;
SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
SOUTHEASTERN SECURITIES, INC.; JOHN STRINE;
THE TRADING DESK, INC. d/b/a TDI, INC.;
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07076)
Peninsula Bank; Joseph
Marzouca,
Appellants (No. 06-5173)

No. 06-5196

DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
TDI INC, (f/k/a Traders and Dealers, Incorporated,
f/k/a TDI, Incorporated, f/k/a The Trading Desk, Inc. and
f/k/a U.S. Central Securities, Inc.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES INC.; SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
PENINSULA BANK; THEODORE BENGHIAT; CASTO
EDWIN RIVERA; JERRY MANNING; JOHN STRINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JOSEPH MARZOUCA
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v.
SANFORD GOLDFINE; S.D. GOLDFINE & CO.;
(Third-Party Defendants)
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07032)
DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
S.D. GOLDFINE & COMPANY; SANFORD GOLDFINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JERRY MANNING; JOSEPH
MARZOUCA; THEODORE BENGHIAT;
JERRY MANNING; JOSEPH MARZOUCA;
PENINSULA BANK; CASTO EDWIN RIVERA;
SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
SOUTHEASTERN SECURITIES, INC.; JOHN STRINE;
THE TRADING DESK, INC. d/b/a TDI, INC.;
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07076)
Southeastern Securities, Inc.; SFG
Financial Services, Inc.; Theodore
Benghiat,
Appellants (No. 06-5196)

No. 07-1010
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DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.,
Appellant (No. 07-1010)
v.
TDI INC, (f/k/a Traders and Dealers, Incorporated,
f/k/a TDI, Incorporated, f/k/a The Trading Desk, Inc. and
f/k/a U.S. Central Securities, Inc.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES INC.; SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
PENINSULA BANK; THEODORE BENGHIAT; CASTO
EDWIN RIVERA; JERRY MANNING; JOHN STRINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JOSEPH MARZOUCA
v.
SANFORD GOLDFINE; S.D. GOLDFINE & CO.;
(Third-Party Defendants)
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07032)
DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
S.D. GOLDFINE & COMPANY; SANFORD GOLDFINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JERRY MANNING; JOSEPH
MARZOUCA; THEODORE BENGHIAT; JERRY
MANNING; JOSEPH MARZOUCA;
PENINSULA BANK; CASTO EDWIN RIVERA; SFG
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
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SOUTHEASTERN SECURITIES, INC.; JOHN STRINE;
THE TRADING DESK, INC. d/b/a TDI, INC.;
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07076)

No. 07-3398

DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
TDI INC, (f/k/a Traders and Dealers, Incorporated,
f/k/a TDI, Incorporated, f/k/a The Trading Desk, Inc. and
f/k/a U.S. Central Securities, Inc.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES INC.; SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
PENINSULA BANK; THEODORE BENGHIAT; CASTO
EDWIN RIVERA; JERRY MANNING; JOHN STRINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JOSEPH MARZOUCA
v.
SANFORD GOLDFINE; S.D. GOLDFINE & CO.;
(Third-Party Defendants)
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07032)
DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
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v.
S.D. GOLDFINE & COMPANY; SANFORD GOLDFINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JERRY MANNING; JOSEPH
MARZOUCA; THEODORE BENGHIAT;
PENINSULA BANK; CASTO EDWIN RIVERA;
SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES, INC.; JOHN STRINE; THE TRADING
DESK, INC. d/b/a TDI, INC.;
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07076)
Peninsula Bank; Joseph
Marzouca,
Appellants (No. 07-3398)

No. 07-3416

DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
TDI INC, (f/k/a Traders and Dealers, Incorporated,
f/k/a TDI, Incorporated, f/k/a The Trading Desk, Inc. and
f/k/a U.S. Central Securities, Inc.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES INC.; SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
PENINSULA BANK; THEODORE BENGHIAT; CASTO
EDWIN RIVERA; JERRY MANNING; JOHN STRINE;
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JEFFREY WILSON; JOSEPH MARZOUCA
v.
SANFORD GOLDFINE; S.D. GOLDFINE & CO.;
(Third-Party Defendants)
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07032)
DAVID H. MARION, as receiver for Bentley
Financial Services, Inc.
v.
S.D. GOLDFINE & COMPANY; SANFORD GOLDFINE;
JEFFREY WILSON; JERRY MANNING; JOSEPH
MARZOUCA; THEODORE BENGHIAT;
PENINSULA BANK; CASTO EDWIN RIVERA;
SFG FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; SOUTHEASTERN
SECURITIES, INC.; JOHN STRINE; THE TRADING
DESK, INC. d/b/a TDI, INC.;
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07076)
Southeastern Securities, Inc.; SFG
Financial Services, Inc.; Theodore
Benghiat,
Appellants (No. 07-3416)
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OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
A receiver for a corporation through which a Ponzi
scheme was run brought suit against various third-parties
alleged to have assisted the scheme, ultimately winning a multimillion-dollar jury verdict. The receiver’s theory of the case
was that the defendants, in concert with the corporation’s chief
officer, had harmed the corporation by saddling it with
additional liability to the scheme’s victims. Following a verdict
9

in the receiver’s favor, the defendants unsuccessfully moved for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing, among other things, that
the receiver lacked standing to bring the claims submitted to the
jury and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
verdict. We agree with the receiver that, under our case law, he
had standing to bring the claims presented to the jury. But we
agree with the defendants that they cannot be liable to the
corporation on the facts presented at trial. Accordingly, we
vacate the District Court’s denial of the defendants’ post-trial
motion for judgment of law and remand with instructions to
enter judgment in their favor.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A.

The Bentley Scheme

In 1986, Robert Bentley established Bentley Financial
Services, Inc. (“BFS”), a Pennsylvania corporation, through
which he brokered bank-issued certificates of deposit (CDs).1
In 1993, Bentley formed the Entrust Group (“Entrust”), a
Pennsylvania sole proprietorship, to act as custodian on BFSbrokered transactions. In the CD-selling industry, the broker is
responsible for connecting CDs available for purchase from
banks with particular investors. The custodian then collects the
money from each investor, wires it to the issuing bank and holds
1

Robert Bentley established BFS with his brother David
Bentley. Robert bought David out in 1993, well before the
scheme began.
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onto the CD, while issuing a “safekeeping receipt” to the
investor indicating that it has title to the CD held by the
custodian.
The CD seller’s profit (often called the “spread”) comes
from the difference between the terms of the CD purchased from
the bank and the terms on which the CD is sold to the investor.
In a simple case, a CD offered by a bank might provide a 5%
interest rate on a two-year maturity, which the broker would
then offer to the investor as a two-year CD at 4.5% interest,
taking the interest-rate difference as profit.
A more complex, and risky, way a CD broker can profit
is by mismatching maturity dates. In one form of maturity
mismatching,2 a broker locks in a particular interest rate for a
long-term CD and then, rather than selling it as a long-term CD
to an investor, sells it as a series of short-term CDs, hoping to
profit from the difference between the market rate for interest in

2

There are multiple forms of mismatching, many of
which were used by Bentley as part of his scheme. We focus
only on this form—the selling of shortened maturities—in order
to provide a general idea of how Bentley’s scheme worked. In
this regard, unless the context requires otherwise, any reference
to Bentley in this subsection A, and subsection B, includes as
well BFS and Entrust.
11

short-term CDs and the long-term rate the broker locked in.3
However, if a purchaser of one of these short-term CDs wants
the investment back at the end of the shortened maturity period
(rather than rolling over the investment), the broker cannot
simply get the principal back from the bank from whom the
broker purchased the long-term CD. In those circumstances, the
broker typically has three options: (1) find another investor for
a new short-term CD and return the outgoing investor’s
principal from the proceeds of that sale; (2) “warehouse” the
long-term CD with a cooperating bank that agrees to purchase
the long-term CD temporarily until an investor for a new shortterm CD can be found, thus allowing the broker to pay the
outgoing investor out of the money loaned by the cooperating
bank; or (3) require the investor to stay locked in to the longterm CD until its actual maturity date or until a substitute
investor can be found to provide the money to pay the outgoing
investor. This form of mismatching is legal as long as the
mismatch is disclosed to the investor (including the fact that the
investor may not be able to reclaim its principal at the maturity
date stated in the investment contract).
Bentley’s operation deviated from the standard business

3

The risk to the broker, of course, is that interest rates on
short-term CDs will increase higher than the locked-in longterm rate.
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model described above in at least two crucial respects.4 First,
and most dramatically, in 1996 Bentley started selling fictitious
CDs. As his own custodian, he could fool investors by issuing
bogus safekeeping receipts. According to Bentley, the decision
to sell fake CDs traced back to 1994 or 1995, when Entrust
obtained a $2 million credit line, secured by commissions, for
cash flow management. In an act that Bentley would later
describe as rooted in impatience, he forged his accountant’s
signature in a letter certifying the collateral. The bank
discovered the forgery in 1996 and called the balance on the
credit line, threatening Bentley’s business. To repay the loan,
Bentley created and sold the fictitious CDs. Because Bentley
used the proceeds of the sales to pay down the loan—rather than
to purchase CDs that would generate interest while retaining the
initial investment—he could only pay the investors the interest
and principal owed on the fake CDs by obtaining money from
new investors (money that, in turn, could not all be used to buy
new CDs).
That was the birth of Bentley’s Ponzi scheme.5 His

4

As indicated already, the account that follows simplifies
Bentley’s scheme.
5

A “Ponzi scheme” gets its name from Charles Ponzi,
who was infamous in the early part of the 20th Century for
devising a scam operation that paid returns to investors not from
the profits earned on investments but from monies paid by later
investors.
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ability to meet his obligations to past investors depended on his
ability to obtain money from new investors, forcing Bentley to
continue the scheme or default.
Trying to escape the financial hole he was digging,
Bentley pursued a strategy of aggressive maturity mismatching.
He purchased long-term CDs, hoping that, if interest rates on
short-term CDs went down, he could generate enough from the
mismatch that he would no longer need to sell fictitious CDs to
meet his obligations as they came due.
That led to a second way in which Bentley’s enterprise
deviated from an above-board CD brokerage operation.
Because Bentley’s customer base comprised primarily
conservative investors such as credit unions, he failed to
disclose the mismatching.6 Thus, investors who purchased
mismatched short-term CDs did not know they were actually
purchasing interests in long-term CDs. If such an investor
wanted its principal back at the end of the stated (that is,
shortened) maturity date, Bentley could not force the investor to
stay with the long-term CD without revealing its true nature.
Instead, he quickly had to find some way to generate the cash
necessary to return the principal, often (when he guessed wrong
about the direction of interest rates) by selling another
6

The risk to the investor who purchases a CD with a
shortened maturity backed by a CD with a longer maturity is
that it might not be able to get the principal out on the shortened
maturity date.
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mismatched short-term CD to a new investor at a higher rate of
interest than the one he initially got from the bank on the longterm CD.
Thus, though Bentley was in fact purchasing
CDs—rather than simply recycling, or embezzling, the money
he obtained from investors—his scheme still embodied some of
the classic features of a Ponzi. In many cases, investors were
not purchasing what they thought they were purchasing. Either
(as in the case of the fictitious CDs) there was no underlying
CD, or (as in the case of the CDs used as part of Bentley’s
mismatching strategy) the terms of the underlying CD did not
match what had been disclosed to the investor. And Bentley’s
ability to make good on his obligations to his investors
depended in significant part on his finding new investors.
B.

Benghiat and Marzouca

This appeal centers on the relationship between Bentley’s
scheme and two figures who would later become defendants in
this case—Ted Benghiat and Joseph Marzouca. Benghiat
owned two Florida firms—(1) SFG Financial, Inc. (“SFG”), a
CD broker with whom BFS frequently served as a co-broker
(with SFG acting as the “wholesale broker,” locating available
CDs from banks, and BFS acting as the “retail broker,”
connecting those CDs to particular clients); and (2) Southeastern
Securities, Inc. (“SSI”), a securities firm. Marzouca was VicePresident of Peninsula Bank, a Florida bank that had an ongoing
relationship with SFG as a warehouser of its CDs, and that later
15

served as a custodian (along with Entrust) on a number of BFS’s
sales. When Peninsula Bank and Entrust worked together as
custodians, Peninsula Bank acted as the “superior custodian,”
while Entrust acted as the “sub-custodian.” That means that
Peninsula Bank would purchase the CD from the bank and hold
it, while issuing a safekeeping receipt to Entrust, which would
then issue a separate safekeeping receipt to the investor.
Graphically depicted, the relationship between the issuing
banks, SFG, Peninsula Bank and Bentley’s two firms (BFS and
Entrust) went as follows:
Banks
(CD Issuers)
SFG (Benghiat)
(Wholesale Broker)

Peninsula Bank (Marzouca)
(Superior Custodian)

BFS (Bentley)
(Retail Broker)

Entrust (Bentley)
(Sub-Custodian)

The primary issue in dispute at trial was whether, and to
what extent, Benghiat and Marzouca knew about Bentley’s
scheme. Bentley testified that Benghiat knew Bentley was
mismatching maturities without telling his investors and had
urged him to disclose it (he did not), but Bentley did not claim
to have told either Benghiat or Marzouca directly about his sale
of fake CDs. What is undisputed is that (knowingly or not)
Benghiat and Marzouca helped the scheme stay afloat in at least
two ways. First, Bentley’s investors would sometimes call
16

issuing banks listed on their safekeeping receipts to confirm that
the banks really issued the CDs. Because the banks only knew
the identities of the superior custodians to which they issued the
CDs, they referred questions to Marzouca at Peninsula Bank.
He forwarded them to Benghiat, who called Bentley with the
names of curious investors. Bentley would then cash the
investors out immediately, waiving any penalty associated with
early withdrawal, to avoid further questions.
Second, on three occasions Benghiat and Marzouca
helped Bentley obtain the cash necessary to keep Bentley’s
operation afloat. The first of these occasions took place in late
1999. Investors spooked by rumors of a Y2K computer bug 7
refused to roll over their short-term CDs, forcing Bentley to
return $138 million in principal. Rates on short-term CDs were
rising, souring his gamble on long-term CDs and forcing him to
pay higher rates to attract money. Bentley raised most of the
cash he needed by finding new investors and liquidating
between $5 million and $20 million of his risky long-term CDs
on the open market. But he also turned to Benghiat for help.
Benghiat spoke with Marzouca, and together the three
parties engineered what they styled as a “warehousing”

7

This refers to what, in the period running up to the turn
of the millennium, was feared to be a glitch in computer recordkeeping where, because of the practice of abbreviating four-digit
years to two digits for data-entry purposes, information would
be lost in the transition from 1999 to 2000.
17

transaction between Bentley’s operation and Peninsula Bank.8
Under the arrangement, Peninsula Bank agreed to purchase
temporarily up to $10 million in CDs from Bentley in exchange
for (1) a non-refundable $100,000 fee to be split between
Marzouca and Benghiat, (2) interest on the CDs plus any
shortfall between such interest and the prevailing prime rate of
interest, and (3) a $1 million security deposit from Entrust
intended to cover the difference (if any) between the purchase
price of the CDs and the amount for which Peninsula Bank
resold them. The deposit was subject to forfeiture if the Bank
failed to sell all the CDs within 120 days. Bentley sold $6.8
million in CDs to Peninsula Bank under this arrangement in
October and November 1999, repurchasing them within 120
days at a total loss in fees and interest of approximately
$300,000. Two more warehousing transactions at virtually the
same terms followed in 2000 and 2001.
Finally, Bentley had a side business brokering securities,
such as bonds. For about 18 months starting at the end of 1998,
he brokered securities for SSI (Benghiat’s firm) on a
commission basis. Because of this relationship, the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), of which SSI was a
member, required SSI to supervise Bentley’s operation. But,
based on legal advice it received, SSI concluded that it was not
8

Whether this transaction, and the similar ones that
followed, should be characterized as a “loan,” rather than a
“sale”, was subject to much dispute at trial. We take no
position.
18

responsible for Bentley’s CD business because the Securities
and Exchange Commission does not regulate CDs. Benghiat
therefore limited SSI’s supervision to the (much smaller) nonCD aspects of Bentley’s operation. When lawyers for SSI
started to worry that the SEC would regulate CDs, SSI (through
Benghiat) terminated Bentley in August 2000, citing Bentley’s
“other activities.”
In September 2001, a Texas bank that had purchased fake
CDs from Bentley tried to confirm its ownership. As usual,
Marzouca forwarded the request through Benghiat to Bentley,
who ultimately bought back the fake CDs from the Texas bank
after acquiring $7.5 million from Peninsula Bank (in the final of
the three warehousing transactions) to do it. But the Texas bank
alerted regulators, and, shortly thereafter, the scheme was
exposed. Bentley later pled guilty to one count of mail fraud for
selling worthless certificates of deposit and one count of bribery
(relating to an aspect of the scheme not at issue in this appeal).
He was sentenced to 55 months’ imprisonment and ordered to
pay $38 million in restitution.
C.

The Civil Proceedings

In October 2001, the SEC filed a civil action against
Bentley, BFS and Entrust (collectively, the “Bentley
defendants”) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In
November 2001, the District Court appointed David H. Marion
as receiver for the Bentley defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 754, giving him “complete jurisdiction over, and control of all
19

the property, real, personal or mixed, . . . wherever located[,] of
[Bentley, BFS, and Entrust].” In August 2002, Marion brought
an action (on behalf of BFS only) against, among others,
Benghiat, SFG and SSI (collectively referred to hereinafter as
“Benghiat”) and Marzouca and Peninsula Bank (collectively
referred to hereinafter as “Marzouca”).9 As amended, the
complaint characterized the action as one “to recover damages
from defendants for injuries, losses, obligations and liabilities
suffered by and imposed upon [BFS] as a result of, inter alia, a
fraudulent scheme orchestrated by [Bentley], and others
(including the defendants).” The complaint alleged that the
defendants had allowed the scheme to succeed “for as long as it
did” by, among other things, failing properly to supervise
Bentley in the face of a duty to do so, and “infus[ing] the
Bentley scheme with additional cash despite knowledge of the
precarious financial condition of BFS and its inability to honor
its investment contracts.”
The case was tried in June 2006. On the claims presented

9

In addition to this action against Benghiat and
Marzouca, various BFS investors later filed an action against
them in Pennsylvania state court. In a letter accompanying the
writ of summons served on Benghiat and Marzouca in that case,
the plaintiffs explained that “we have filed this action as a
protective measure in the event the Receiver’s claims are
dismissed for lack of standing. Assuming resolution of the
Receiver’s lawsuits fully addresses the pertinent issues, we
would have no reason to ever file a Complaint . . . .”
20

to the jury, there were three separate bases for finding liability.
The jury could find that, in arranging the three warehousing
transactions with Bentley, Benghiat and Marzouca had either (1)
aided and abetted, or (2) conspired in, Bentley’s fraud.10 Or (3)
the jury could find (with respect to Benghiat only) that he was
liable for Bentley’s fraud under a respondeat superior theory for
failing to exercise adequate supervision during the period in
which Bentley sold securities for SSI.
In addition, Marion submitted three separate measures of
damages to the jury. The first, which came to $32,774,330,
corresponded to the sums owed on the “new money” invested in
the scheme after August 6, 1999 (when Bentley first enlisted the
aid of Benghiat and Marzouca). The second measure, which
came to $31,414,979, corresponded to BFS’s total insolvency
(the difference between its assets and its liabilities) as of
October 23, 2001, the day before the receiver was appointed.
The final measure corresponded to the amount by which BFS’s
insolvency increased between August 6, 1999 and October 23,
2001.

10

It was explained that, to find Benghiat and Marzouca
liable on either the aiding and abetting claim or the conspiracy
claim, the jury had to find that they were aware of Bentley’s
scheme when they arranged the different warehousing
transactions.
21

The jury found both Benghiat and Marzouca liable.11 It
assigned damages in the amount of $13,109,732 to Marzouca
and $19,664,598 to Benghiat, sums that, when added up, equal
the $32,774,330 under the first measure of damages listed above
(the “new money” damages).
Benghiat and Marzouca moved for judgment as a matter
of law, arguing both that Marion lacked standing to bring the
claims presented to the jury and that, at any rate, the evidence
did not support the verdict.12 Marion moved to mold the verdict
to reflect joint and several liability. The District Court denied
all the parties’ motions. Benghiat and Marzouca later moved for
relief from judgment, after discovering that Marion purportedly
had prevented one of his experts from stating his opinion that
there were no damages in the case. The Court denied that
motion as well, and both parties appeal from the denial of their
11

The precise ground on which the jury found the
defendants liable was not specified. The interrogatory submitted
to the jury simply asked (for Benghiat and Marzouca separately)
whether each had “conspired with or aided and assisted Robert
Bentley in his fraudulent activities.” No separate interrogatory
was provided for the respondeat superior claim, nor were the
conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims distinguished.
12

Benghiat and Marzouca also argued that the doctrine of
in pari delicto (that a plaintiff cannot recover for damages from
a defendant when the plaintiff is partly at fault) barred Marion,
as a receiver stepping into BFS’s shoes, from recovering for
harm caused by Bentley’s scheme.
22

various post-trial motions.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77v(a) & 78aa over Marion’s claims against Benghiat and
Marzouca because those claims were ancillary to a suit
obtaining judgment against the Bentley defendants under federal
securities law. See Pope v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago
R.R., 173 U.S. 573, 577 (1899); Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762,
769 (9th Cir. 2008). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
We review a District Court’s “denial of judgment as a
matter of law de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.” Acumed LLC v. Advanced
Surgical Servs., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
For Benghiat and
Marzouca’s challenge to Marion’s standing, we review the
District Court’s legal conclusions de novo, “but review for clear
error the factual elements underlying the District Court’s
determination of standing.” Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek
Elecs. & Mfg., 197 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1999). For Benghiat
and Marzouca’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
against them, we “may grant . . . judgment as a matter of law
contrary to the verdict only if ‘the record is critically deficient
of the minimum quantum of evidence’ to sustain the verdict.”
Acumed, 561 F.3d at 211 (quoting Gomez v. Allegheny Health
23

Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995)).
III. Discussion
Benghiat and Marzouca challenge the jury’s verdict
against them on multiple grounds, including whether Marion
had standing to bring the claims on which they were found liable
and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict
against them. Our case law requires that we side with Marion
on the standing issue, but we agree with Benghiat and Marzouca
that neither can be liable to Marion (as BFS’s receiver) for the
actions over which the jury passed judgment.13
A.

Standing

To begin, we must confront Benghiat and Marzouca’s
argument that Marion lacked standing to bring the claims
presented to the jury. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (explaining that the issue of
standing, because it implicates a federal court’s authority to hear

13

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against
them, Benghiat and Marzouca focus particular attention on the
argument that the evidence was insufficient to show that they
had knowledge of Bentley’s scheme when they (allegedly)
contributed to it. Because we believe that their contributions to
Bentley’s scheme, even if knowing, could not give rise to
liability to BFS (transferred to Marion standing in BFS’s shoes),
we do not reach that issue.
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a case, must be addressed as a threshold matter). Benghiat and
Marzouca argue that Marion lacked standing because the
injuries for which he sought compensation were those of the
investors victimized by Bentley’s scheme, not BFS. Marion
concedes that, acting as the receiver for BFS, he could only
bring suit to address injuries to BFS. Marion’s Br. at 42–43.
His argument is that, appearances to the contrary, the harm over
which he asked the jury to pass judgment was to BFS.
Intuitively, Benghiat and Marzouca seem correct. That
is, this action certainly has the look and feel of an effort to avoid
the general rule that an “equity receiver may sue only to redress
injuries to the entity in receivership.” Scholes v. Lehmann, 56
F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.,); see also Donell, 533
F.3d at 777; Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir.
2008); Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th
Cir. 2003); Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. Chase Bank of Tex, N.A., 274
F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2001); Goodman v. FCC, 182 F.3d 987,
991–92 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922
F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1990). That is the impression left by some
of the remarks made by Marion’s counsel to the jury over the
course of the trial.
In his opening statement at trial, Marion’s attorney
asserted that “the purpose of this . . . case is to obtain a verdict
so that all the victims of the Bentley scheme can be paid what
they [are] owed.” In that same statement, he described Marion’s
job as a receiver as being “to help the victims of the scheme” by
first “collect[ing] the money” still existing in the scheme, and
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then “investigat[ing] . . . to see if claims should be made against
all those who worked with [Bentley] so that all the obligations
to the victims can be paid.” In asking the jury for damages in
his closing argument, Marion’s counsel contended that
“[f]undamental fairness requires that at a minimum the investors
get back the full amount of their principal and the interest they
were promised,” and described the measure of damages
ultimately awarded—the “new money” damages—as “what the
receiver needs in order to repay the investors what they are
owed.”
Marion retorts that more important than these remarks
was the District Judge’s actual jury charge, to wit:
The receiver has an obligation to take over the
assets of the business . . . , and also is empowered
to collect any monies that might be due the
businesses.
The lawsuit is an attempt by the receiver to collect
money which the receiver claims should be paid
to the receivership as due the receivership because
of the implication of the defendants in some of
Mr. Bentley’s activities.
In this context, we do not take the remarks of Marion’s
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counsel as necessarily decisive for standing purposes.14
Moreover, it is undisputed that Marion was acting for the benefit
of the investors (even though he lacked authority to bring claims
directly on their behalf). See Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567
F.3d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he purpose of a receiver [is]
to marshal the receivership entities’ assets . . . so that the assets
may be distributed to the injured parties in a manner the court
deems equitable.”); SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[A] primary purpose of equity receiverships is to
promote orderly and efficient administration of the estate . . . for
the benefit of creditors.”). As we have explained in the
analogous bankruptcy context, it is irrelevant to the issue of

14

No doubt some of the remarks of Marion’s counsel
(especially those delivered in his closing argument) implied that
the jury’s task was to determine whether Benghiat and
Marzouca caused the investors compensable injuries. That
certainly supports the notion that Marion was really pursuing the
claims of Bentley’s victims. Yet, if there were a cognizable
theory of injury underlying Marion’s claims, and the problem
was simply that his attorney mischaracterized those claims, the
remedy would be to order a new trial (provided that the requisite
level of prejudice was shown), not to dismiss the case for lack
of standing. See Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 351 (3d
Cir. 2005) (explaining that a new trial is warranted when
counsel makes “improper statements” and it is “reasonably
probable” that the “verdict was influenced by the resulting
prejudice”). Because we believe the trial evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict, we need not discuss this issue
further.
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standing that “a successfully prosecuted cause of action [will
result in] an inflow of money to the estate that will immediately
flow out again to repay creditors.” 15 Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340,
348–49 (3d Cir. 2001).
We thus turn to the heart of the standing issue—whether
a distinct injury to BFS underlay Marion’s claims. In his
supplemental briefing before us, Marion describes his theory of
liability as follows: Benghiat and Marzouca, through their
actions (and, in Benghiat’s case, omissions as well), allowed
Bentley’s scheme to continue, and this “damaged the
responsible corporation (BFS) . . . because . . . it is inevitable in
a Ponzi scheme that there will be obligations that the
corporation is unable to pay when the scheme is exposed.”
Marion’s Supp’l Br. at 2. In other words, the claim is that
Benghiat and Marzouca helped Bentley, and that help harmed
BFS because it caused BFS to enter into more losing investment
contracts than it otherwise would have. That (according to
Marion) is why it was appropriate for the damages awarded to
compensate BFS to equal the money owed to investors who
came on board after Benghiat and Marzouca’s involvement—the

15

A bankruptcy trustee lacks authority to bring a claim
directly on behalf of the debtor’s creditors. See Caplin v.
Marine Midland Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 421–34 (1972). Thus,
the standing issue in the bankruptcy context is the same one we
face here—determining to whom the claims being brought
belong.
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harm to BFS was essentially the harm in taking on additional
liability to the defrauded investors.16
This claim, if plausible (and for purposes of this opinion
we assume it is), steps over the relatively low standing
threshold. A receiver no doubt has standing to bring a suit on
behalf of the debtor corporation against third parties who
allegedly helped that corporation’s management harm the
corporation.17 Though Bentley controlled BFS, its separate

16

In denying Benghiat and Marzouca’s post-trial motion
for judgment as a matter of law, the District Court framed
Marion’s theory as follows: “Bentley . . . breached his fiduciary
duty to the corporation by subjecting it to liability for fraud, and
[Benghiat and Marzouca] assisted him in doing so.” Marion v.
TDI, Inc., Nos. 02-7032 & 02-7076, 2006 WL 3742747, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2006). The problem here is that an aiding
and abetting a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was never
presented to the jury. The only claims presented were for aiding
and abetting, or conspiring in, Bentley’s fraud, or otherwise
assuming responsibility (in Benghiat’s case) for the fraud on a
respondeat superior theory.
17

Such a suit might, however, be vulnerable to the
defense of in pari delicto, which embodies the idea “that a
plaintiff wrongdoer cannot recover from a defendant
wrongdoer.” In re: CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672, 681 n.12 (3d Cir.
2006). However, the in pari delicto issue is separate from that
of standing, which is what we deal with here. See Lafferty, 267
F.3d at 346 (explaining that “[a]n analysis of standing does not
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corporate form makes it possible under our precedent to allege
that Bentley (and those who helped him) harmed BFS. See
Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 348 (“In Pennsylvania, as in almost every
other state, ‘a corporation is a distinct and separate entity,
irrespective of the persons who own all its stock.’” (quoting
Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954))).
We found standing to bring a suit with that basic structure in
Lafferty (albeit in the bankruptcy context), id. at 346–354, and
other courts have done so specifically in the receiver context.
See, e.g., Donell, 533 F.3d at 777; Scholes, 56 F.3d at 753–54.
We confess to being less comfortable with what Marion’s
theory identifies as the actual harm to BFS—essentially the
harm of being responsible for the injury caused in the first
instance to the investors. That seems to eliminate the cogency
of any distinction between harm to the debtor and harm to the
creditors. Yet we recognize that Marion’s theory of injury finds
support in the law of our Court. In Lafferty, we held that a
creditors’ committee, acting on behalf of a corporation, had
standing to bring suit against third-party professionals who had
allegedly conspired with the corporation’s management to
prolong the Ponzi scheme operated through it. 267 F.3d at
346–54. We based standing on the notion that, under
Pennsylvania law, the third-party defendants, by offering
“professional opinions” that were alleged to have wrongfully

include an analysis of equitable defenses, such as in pari
delicto”).
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helped the scheme evade detection, had injured the corporation
by deepening its insolvent condition. Id. at 347.
Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2008), is even
more helpful to Marion. There we held that a corporation
suffered injury “separate from an injury to its creditors” when
allegedly negligent auditing allowed it to write insurance
policies that it lacked the reserves to cover, a conclusion we
based on the notion that “an increase in liabilities is a harm to
the company.” 18 Id. at 523; see also id. at 521 (“[T]he damages
here are losses incurred on insurance policies that would not
have been written but for [the auditor’s] negligence.”). That
seems to be more or less the theory on which Marion
proceeded—that Benghiat and Marzouca injured BFS because
their actions led it to take on additional liability to the investors.
With our case law framing the context, we conclude that
Marion sufficiently alleged an injury distinct to BFS (suffered
at the hands of Benghiat and Marzouca) to get past the standing
threshold. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992) (explaining that standing requires (1) a
cognizable injury suffered by the plaintiff, that is (2) fairly
traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant, and (3)

18

Thabault does not appear to have addressed the issue
of standing directly. Its discussion of what constitutes a distinct
injury to the insurance company arose in the context of
considering a challenge to the damages awarded to the receiver
for that company. Id. at 518–23.
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redressable by a court). Probing Marion’s theory any further
would, we believe, take us into a discussion of the merits of his
claims, something separate from the standing inquiry. See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“[S]tanding in no
way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that
particular conduct is illegal . . . .”).
B.

The Merits

We turn to the merits directly, and here the outcome is
less happy for Marion. There are two factual determinations
that the jury could have made in finding both Benghiat and
Marzouca liable—(1) that Benghiat and Marzouca helped
Bentley infuse cash into his operation knowing that the money
would be used to keep the scheme afloat; and (2) (in Benghiat’s
case only) that he failed to exercise adequate supervision over
Bentley’s CD-brokerage operation during a time in which
Bentley sold securities for SSI.19
Neither of those findings, however, could give rise to
liability to Marion standing in BFS’s shoes. In the case of the
first finding, the requisite causal link between Benghiat and
Marzouca’s actions and the harm BFS allegedly suffered (i.e.,

19

Because the jury found both Benghiat and Marzouca
liable, it had to have found (1) to be true. We do not know
whether it also found (2) to be true, and can only speculate that
it did based on its having apportioned more liability to Benghiat
than Marzouca.
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economic loss) is missing. In the case of the second finding, the
relevant breach of a duty would have been to the investors, not
BFS. Thus, in neither case is the verdict supported by the
evidence.
1.

The Warehousing Transactions

In instructing the jury, the District Court summarized
Marion’s theory with regard to the warehousing transactions
entered into between Bentley, Benghiat and Marzouca as
follows:
[T]he fundamental contention is
that if the money had not been put
up by [Peninsula Bank when it
was,] . . . the fraudulent scheme
would have terminated at that time
because Mr. Bentley was running
out of money and could not have
continued and, therefore[,] . . . the
damages amount to all of the
money that was invested in the
receivership estate after the loan
was agreed to.
This cannot serve as a basis for finding Benghiat and Marzouca
liable to Marion (substituting for BFS). Our cases make clear
that there cannot be liability to a corporation for increasing its
short-term liquidity. This is so even where (as alleged here) the
new money brought into the company allowed it to stay afloat
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long enough to put itself in a worse position than it was in prior
to the cash infusion. See In re CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672, 677-78
(3d Cir. 2006); Thabault, 541 F.3d at 521.
The problem in this kind of scenario is one of proximate
causation. Between the initial act (the injecting of money into
the business) and the end result (the expansion of the company’s
debt relative to where it was prior to the cash infusion) stand the
intervening acts of the company’s management (i.e., what it
chose to do with the money). We illustrated this point in CitX.
There the trustee for a company that had operated a Ponzi
scheme brought suit against the company’s accounting firm,
arguing that the firm’s negligent financial reports had allowed
it to hide its true financial condition from investors, thus raising
more money and eventually going even deeper into debt. 448
F.3d at 674–78. We held that a jury could not conclude that the
accounting firm had caused the company’s economic injuries on
those facts, reasoning as follows:
[Citx argues] that the $1,000,000
equity investment allowed CitX to
exist long enough for its
management to incur millions more
in debt. But that looks at the issue
through hindsight bias. . . .[T]he
equity investment was hardly
harmful to CitX. Its management .
. . misused the opportunity created
by that investment; . . . and therein
lies the harm to CitX.
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Id. at 677–78; see also Thabault, 541 F.3d at 521 (“To the extent
that the extra capital, which decreased CitX’s insolvency,
extended the corporation’s life and allowed management to
incur more debt, the ultimate harm was caused by
mismanagement, not the auditor.”). For just that reason, the
warehousing transactions cannot serve as basis for Benghiat and
Marzouca’s liability to BFS (even if engineered with full
awareness of Bentley’s scheme). The losses BFS suffered as a
result were proximately caused by Bentley’s subsequent actions,
not the cash infusion itself.20
2.

Benghiat’s Supervision of Bentley’s Operation

The other basis for finding liability (with respect to
Benghiat) related to the roughly 18 months during which
Bentley brokered securities under the supervision of SSI
(Benghiat’s firm). Pre-trial, it was a matter of considerable
dispute whether Benghiat’s duty to supervise Bentley’s sales of
securities at SSI extended to his CD-brokerage operation, since

20

We take no position on whether, in a suit brought by
the investors against Benghiat and Marzouca, the same
proximate cause problem would arise. An investor suit might
bring in a wider scope of activity than this one—what Benghiat
and Marzouca allegedly helped Bentley do to the investors.
Here, our focus is simply on what transpired among Benghiat,
Marzouca and BFS and our conclusion that the transactions at
issue did not harm BFS.
.
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CDs purchased from federally regulated banks are not generally
considered securities for purposes of federal securities law. See
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1982). The
position ultimately taken by the District Court (and charged to
the jury) was that “[t]o the extent that [Bentley] altered the terms
of [the] certificates of deposit, the certificates themselves would
be considered securities, and to the extent that he issued what
amounted to investment contracts certifying that he was
investing or had invested, those certificates he issued would
qualify as securities.”
We need not decide whether the District Court was
correct to conclude that, insofar as Bentley was brokering fake
CDs, he was selling securities, and thus that Benghiat had a duty
to supervise that aspect of Bentley’s operation as well. That is
because, even if Benghiat had such a duty, it ran to the investors
who purchased the fake CDs, not to BFS, the company through
which the fake CDs were sold.
In his complaint, Marion asserted that Benghiat is
secondarily liable under section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for Bentley’s violations of SEC Rule
10b-5, which prohibits fraudulent schemes and devices in
connection with the sale of securities.21 Section 20(a) provides
21

Rule 10b-5 makes it “unlawful . . . [t]o engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the . . . sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. It
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in pertinent part that
[e]very person who, directly or
indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with[,] and to
the same extent as[,] such
controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is
liable . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). In the context of the “broker-dealer”
relationship like the one at issue here, we have described section
20(a) as imposing “a stringent duty to supervise employees.”
Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975).
But, even though section 20(a) could make Benghiat
liable for Bentley’s Rule 10b-5 violations in the right
circumstances, we do not see how it could make Benghiat liable
to BFS (and thus Marion) for those violations. To make out a
securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, “a plaintiff must show

implements section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which makes it “unlawful" to “use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . ., any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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that ‘(1) the defendant made a materially false or misleading
statement or omitted to state a material fact necessary to make
a statement not misleading; (2) the defendant acted with
scienter; and (3) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s
misstatement caused him or her injury.’” In re Merck & Co. Sec.
Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cal. Pub.
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir.
2004)). Plainly, BFS could not establish the third of these
elements against Bentley—that it was caused harm through its
reliance on Bentley’s deceit. BFS did not rely on Bentley’s
misrepresentations. Rather, as we said earlier, any harm to it
was brought about by becoming liable for Bentley’s fraud on the
investors.
If Bentley could not be liable to BFS for violating Rule
10b-5, then Benghiat could not be secondarily liable to BFS for
Bentley’s violation. The liability section 20(a) imposes on
“controlling persons” is specifically liability to those “to whom
[the] controlled person is [also] liable.” § 78t(a) (emphasis
added). In this case, that could only be the defrauded investors.
Section 20(a) therefore cannot support the use to which Marion
put it here—to impose a duty on Benghiat to BFS to prevent
Bentley from defrauding the investors. Because Bentley’s duty
under Rule 10b-5 not to defraud his investors only ran to them,
any corresponding supervisory duty Benghiat might have had
only ran to those investors as well.
Once again, the facts we presume were found by the jury
(in this instance, that Benghiat provided inadequate supervision
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of Bentley’s activities at SSI) cannot support liability to Marion.
If Benghiat did breach a duty to supervise under these facts, it
was a duty owed to Bentley’s investors, not to the corporation
through which the securities were sold.
*

*

*

*

*

We conclude that, based on our case law, Marion did
have standing to bring the claims presented to the jury.
However, we also conclude that, on the facts presented to the
jury, neither Benghiat nor Marzouca can be liable to Marion
acting as BFS’s receiver. Accordingly, we reverse the District
Court’s denial of Benghiat and Marzouca’s post-trial motion for
judgment as a matter of law and remand with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
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